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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Sonny Rome appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Rome filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for burglary.  
(R., pp. 5-11, 25-37.)  Two counts relevant to this appeal were that trial counsel was 
ineffective for not seeking an aiding and abetting jury instruction (Count VI) and appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim of cumulative error (Count X).  (R., pp. 
31-32, 34-35.) 
 At the evidentiary hearing on the petition Rome called Jay Logsdon, who had 
represented Rome both in the trial and the appeal of the criminal case.  (Tr., p. 9, L. 16 – 
p. 10, L. 5; p. 23, Ls. 8-10.)  Logsdon testified that, “in hindsight” he could have presented 
a theory that Rome was an accessory after the fact but that he did not present that theory 
or request jury instructions on that theory.  (Tr., p. 21, L. 17 – p. 22, L. 3.)  Logsdon was 
not asked about raising a cumulative error theory on appeal. (Tr., p. 61, Ls. 2-20.) 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing the district court granted a directed 
verdict denying Rome post-conviction relief.  (R., pp. 102-03; Tr., p. 64, L. 5 – p. 79, L. 
3.)  The district court found the evidence insufficient as to Count VI, failure to seek an 
aiding and abetting instruction, because there was no evidence of deficient performance or 
prejudice.  (R., pp. 102-03; Tr., p. 58, L. 20 – p. 60, L. 16.)   The district court found the 
evidence insufficient as to Count X, failure to raise a claim of cumulative error, because 
“there is no evidence in this record that appellate counsel failed to raise the issue of 
cumulative error.”  (Tr., p. 75, L. 15 – p. 76, L. 3.)   
2 
 








 Rome states the issues on appeal as: 
I. Whether the district court erred by not taking judicial notice of the 
documents in the underlying criminal case record as requested by 
Mr. Rome based on its clearly erroneous determination that he had 
not requested it to take judicial notice. 
 
II. Whether the district court’s decision to deny Mr. Rome’s lesser-
included instruction claim fails to apply the proper standards for 
evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at an 
evidentiary hearing.  
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Rome failed to show error in the district court’s grant of a directed verdict on 
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 The district court granted the state’s motion for directed verdict on Counts VI and 
X for failing to support those claims with evidence.  (R., pp. 102-03; Tr., p. 58, L. 20 – p. 
60, L. 16; p. 75, L. 15 – p. 76, L. 3.)  Rome contends that the district court erred by granting 
a directed verdict on Count X on the basis of lack of evidence because he asked the court 
to take judicial notice of evidence that would have supported that claim.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 6-9.)  He contends the district court applied an erroneous legal standard when it directed 
a verdict on Count VI.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-20.)  Rome does not, however, apply the 
legal standards relevant to review of the granting of a motion for a directed verdict.  
Application of the relevant and correct legal standards to the record shows Rome’s claims 
of error to be without merit. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “When reviewing a decision to grant or deny a motion for a directed verdict, this 
Court applies the same standard the trial court applied when originally ruling on the 
motion.”  Enriquez v. Idaho Power Co., 152 Idaho 562, 565, 272 P.3d 534, 537 (2012).  
“In doing so, this Court exercises free review and does not defer to the findings of the trial 
court.”  Powers v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 139 Idaho 333, 335, 79 P.3d 154, 156 (2003).  
“This Court must determine whether, admitting the truth of the adverse evidence and 
drawing every legitimate inference most favorably to the opposing party, there exists 
substantial evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury.”  Waterman v. Nationwide 
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Mut. Ins. Co., 146 Idaho 667, 672, 201 P.3d 640, 645 (2009).  “The ‘substantial evidence’ 
test does not require the evidence be uncontradicted.  It requires only that the evidence be 
of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that a 
verdict in favor of the party against whom the motion is made is proper.”  Gunter v. 
Murphy’s Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 27, 105 P.3d 676, 687 (2005) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 
C. The Record Shows There Is No Substantial Evidence To Support The Claim That 
Counsel Was Ineffective For Not Raising A Claim Of Cumulative Error On Appeal 
 
 In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-conviction 
petitioner must prove both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 
P.2d 299, 307 (1989).  To show deficient performance a petitioner “must show that 
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”  Harrington 
v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011).  The court “must apply a strong presumption” that 
counsel’s performance was not deficient.  Id.  To overcome this presumption the petitioner 
must “show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”  Id. 
Strategic decisions by counsel will not be second-guessed “unless those decisions 
are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings 
capable of objective evaluation.”  Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 60, 106 P.3d 376, 386 
(2004) (citation omitted).  Where the claim is that counsel’s performance was deficient for 
failing to file a motion, the court employs a two-step process of first determining “whether 
or not the motion should have been granted,” and second, if the motion would have been 
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granted, “the petitioner is still required to overcome the presumption that the decision not 
to file the motion was within the wide range of permissible discretion and trial strategy.”  
Wurdemann v. State, 161 Idaho 713, 718, 390 P.3d 439, 444 (2017) (emphasis original, 
internal citations and quotations omitted). 
“[W]e use the same test to evaluate ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on 
direct appeal as we use to evaluate ineffective assistance of trial counsel.”  Dunlap v. State, 
159 Idaho 280, 296, 360 P.3d 289, 305 (2015).   
In this case there was no evidence that, when making the tactical decision of what 
issues to raise on appeal, counsel was ignorant of the law or the record, was inadequately 
prepared, or had any other objective shortcoming.  To the contrary, the record shows Mr. 
Logsdon was asked no questions about not raising a claim of cumulative error on appeal.  
(E.g. Tr., p. 61, Ls. 2-20.)  There is no evidence in this record that counsel’s performance 
was deficient for failure to claim cumulative error. 
Nor was there any evidence presented that Rome could have prevailed on an 
appellate claim of cumulative error.  “The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a 
conviction when there is an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might 
be harmless, but when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in 
contravention of the defendant’s constitutional right to due process.”  State v. Draper, 151 
Idaho 576, 594, 261 P.3d 853, 871 (2011) (citations, quotations and alteration omitted).  A 
necessary predicate to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than 
one error.  State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998).  Rome presented 
no evidence that the court in his appeal found two errors, but that the errors were 
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individually harmless.  Without evidence of two harmless errors to cumulate, there was no 
evidence of deficient performance or prejudice. 
On appeal Rome contends the district court should have taken judicial notice of the 
evidence that would have supported his claim.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-9.)  He points out 
that he asked for judicial notice of certain exhibits in response to the state’s motion for 
summary dismissal (Appellant’s brief, p. 6 (citing R., pp. 49-50, 80)), and included items 
he intended to admit by judicial notice at the hearing in his lists of witnesses and exhibits 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6 (citing R., pp. 85, 88)).1  Rome’s claim that he presented sufficient 
evidence to avoid a directed verdict by requesting judicial notice at a prior summary 
dismissal hearing and mentioning potential exhibits in pre-hearing notices is specious.  He 
has pointed to nothing in the record suggesting he presented substantial evidence 
supporting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for not asserting cumulative error 
on appeal. 
 
D. The Record Shows There Is No Substantial Evidence To Support The Claim That 
Counsel Was Ineffective For Not Requesting An Aiding And Abetting Instruction 
 
 Rome alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for not seeking a “proper” aiding 
and abetting jury instruction (Count VI).  (R., pp. 31-32.)  In Idaho an aider and abettor is 
a principal.  I.C. § 18-204.  The “proper” jury instruction on aiding and abetting is ICJI 311 
(the “law makes no distinction” between principals and aider and abettors).  Rome 
                                            
1 Although there is no legal basis for this Court doing so, the state does not object to this 
Court’s consideration of the appellate record from the criminal case, State v. Rome, Docket 
No. 43213.  It shows that the Idaho Court of Appeals found no error, much less two errors 
that were harmless individually.  The claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
for failing to claim cumulative error is frivolous and without a good faith basis in fact. 
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presented no evidence of what aiding and abetting instruction was given at trial or how it 
was deficient performance or prejudicial to not request a “proper” one.  
 On appeal Rome contends there was sufficient evidence to support a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to seek a jury instruction for accessory after the 
fact.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-20.)  This argument fails because Rome has failed to show 
that he raised such a claim in his petition.  Even if he had presented evidence of an unpled 
claim, such would not show error in granting a directed verdict against him on an unpled 
claim. 
 Even if Rome had made a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 
request a jury instruction on accessory after the fact, he presented no substantial evidence 
to support such a claim.  He did present the testimony of Mr. Logsdon that, “in hindsight,” 
he believed he could have argued the theory of accessory after the fact, but that he did not 
do so.  (Tr., p. 21, L. 17 – p. 22, L. 3.)  This is not substantial evidence that counsel’s 
decision to not pursue an accessory after the fact theory at trial was the result of an objective 
shortcoming or that Rome was prejudiced.   
 On appeal Rome argues that trial counsel’s “uncontradicted testimony” was 
sufficient to meet a burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 10-11.)  While it is true that Mr. Logsdon’s testimony is sufficient to establish the facts 
he testified to, merely establishing that (a) trial counsel believes in hindsight that he would 
have been able to argue for the giving of such an instruction and (b) that he did not do so 
does not come close to establishing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
 Rome next argues that a district court is statutorily obligated to present a jury 
instruction when both requested and supported by evidence.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.)  
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First, Mr. Logsdon’s opinion that the evidence supported the giving of an instruction is not 
proof that such an instruction would have been given if requested.  More importantly, 
however, this argument bears little if any relevance to the question of whether counsel was 
ineffective for not requesting the instruction.  It certainly shows no objective shortcoming 
of counsel, and even if the court would have given the instruction there is no evidence that 
the jury would have acquitted on the greater charge if only the accessory instruction had 
been given. 
 Rome finally argues that the district court’s reasoning, that the fact of conviction 
on the greater offense in combination with the “acquittal first” instruction, is not a legally 
valid basis for rejecting his claim of prejudice from lack of an accessory after the fact 
instruction.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-20.)  This argument is irrelevant insofar as it invites 
this Court to review whether the district court employed the correct legal standard.    
Powers, 139 Idaho at 335, 79 P.3d at 156 (“this Court exercises free review and does not 
defer to the findings of the trial court”).  It is also irrelevant insofar as there is no evidence 
of deficient performance or prejudice.  Regardless of whether the “acquittal first” doctrine 
is determinative, there is no evidence of prejudice under any theory.   
 Rome’s theories of error are all predicated on an incorrect articulation of the 
standard of review.  Because this Court reviews the directed verdict motion de novo and 
without deference, Rome’s arguments that the district court employed incorrect legal 
standards, even if true, are irrelevant.  Application of the correct legal standards to the 







 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
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